CUBA
Compiled from the August 2004 Background Note and supplemented with additional information from the State Department and the editors of this volume. See the introduction to this set for explanatory notes.
Official Name:
Republic of Cuba
PROFILE
Geography
Area: 110,860 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about the size of Pennsylvania.
Cities: Capital—Havana (pop. 2 million). Other major cities—Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Holguin, Guantanamo, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Pinar del Rio.
Terrain: Flat or gently rolling plains, hills; mountains up to 2,000 meters (6,000 ft.) in the southeast.
Climate: Tropical, moderated by trade winds; dry season (November-April); rainy season (May-October).
People
Population: 11 million; 70% urban, 30% rural.
Ethnic groups: 51% mulatto, 37% white, 11% black, 1% Chinese (according to Cuban census data).
Language: Spanish. Literacy—95%.
Work force: (4.5 million) Government and services—30%; industry—22%; agriculture—20%; commerce—11%; construction—11%; transportation and communications—6%.
Government
Type: Totalitarian Communist state; current government assumed power by force January 1, 1959.
Independence: May 20, 1902.
Political party : Cuban Communist Party (PCC); only one party allowed.
Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces, including the city of Havana, and one special municipality (Isle of Youth).
Economy
(Statistics drawn from the CIA World Fact Book)
GDP: (2003 est.) Purchasing power parity—$31.59 billion.
Real Annual growth rate: 6.2% (1999); 3.0% (2001); 1.1% (2002); 1.3% (2003 est.).
GDP Per capita income: (based on purchasing power parity) $2,800 (2003 est.).
Natural resources: Nickel, cobalt, iron ore, copper, manganese, salt, timber.
Agriculture: Products—sugar, citrus and tropical fruits, tobacco, coffee, rice, beans, meat, vegetables.
Industry: Types—sugar and food processing, oil refining, cement, electric power, light consumer and industrial products.
Trade: Exports—__BODY__.467 billion: (2003 est.) nickel/cobalt, sugar and its byproducts, tobacco, seafood, pharmaceuticals, citrus, tropical fruits, coffee. Major markets—Netherlands $480 million (this figure includes goods shipped to the Netherlands for onward shipment to EU countries); Canada $265 million;Russia $185 million; Venezuela $150 million (est.); Spain $125 million. Imports—$4.531 billion: petroleum, food, machinery, chemicals. Major suppliers—Venezuela $900 million; Spain $700 million; Italy $375 million; China $340 million; United States $295 million.
Official exchange rate: 1 Cuban peso=U.S.__BODY__ (official rate). 27 Cuban pesos=U.S.__BODY__ (internal exchange rate)
PEOPLE AND RELIGION
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly Spanish and African origins. The largest organized religion is the Roman Catholic Church, but evangelical protestant denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba.
Officially, Cuba has been an atheist state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of Fidel Castro seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the Communist Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.
While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to freedom of religion, the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Methodists, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the Evangelical Lutheran Church, are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including Jehovah's Witnesses and the small Jewish community, do not belong to the CCC. The Government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the Government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and harassment of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations—including the Catholic church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today—continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent printing press capabilities; full access to the media; to train enough priests for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country; or to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.
The visit of Pope John Paul II in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish Internet connections or an intranet among dioceses on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly amoral and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.
Other Cuban religious groups—including evangelical Christians, whose numbers continue to grow rapidly—also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.
HISTORY
Spanish settlers established the raising of cattle, sugarcane, and tobacco as Cuba's primary economic pursuits. As the native Indian population died out, African slaves were imported to work the ranches and plantations. Slavery was abolished in 1886.
Cuba was the last major Spanish colony to gain independence, following a lengthy struggle begun in 1868. Jose Marti, Cuba's national hero, helped initiate the final push for independence in 1895. In 1898, the United States entered the conflict after an explosion of undetermined origin caused the USS Maine to sink in Havana Harbor on February 15. In December of that year, under the Treaty of Paris, Spain relinquished control of Cuba to the United States. On May 20, 1902, the United States granted Cuba its independence but retained the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and stability in accordance with the Platt Amendment. In 1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed. The United States and Cuba concluded a Treaty of Relations in 1934 which, among other things, continued the 1903 agreements that leased the Guantanamo Bay naval base to the United States.
Independent Cuba was often ruled by authoritarian political and military figures who either obtained or remained in power by force. Fulgencio Batista, an army sergeant, organized a non-commissioned officer revolt in September 1933 and wielded significant power behind the scenes until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and did not run in 1948. Both those elections were won by civilian political figures with the support of party organizations. Running for president again in 1952, Batista seized power in a bloodless coup 3 months before the election was to take place, suspended the balloting, and began ruling by decree. Many political figures and movements that wanted a return to the government according to the Constitution of 1940 disputed Batista's undemocratic rule.
On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro, who had been involved in increasingly violent political activity before Batista's coup, led a failed attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba in which more than 100 died. After defending himself in a trial open to national and international media, he was convicted and jailed, and subsequently was freed in an act of clemency, then went into exile in Mexico. There he organized the "26th of July Movement" with the goal of overthrowing Batista, and the group
sailed to Cuba on board the yacht Granma, landing in the eastern part of the island in December 1956.
Batista's dictatorial rule fueled increasing popular discontent and the rise of many active urban and rural resistance groups, a fertile political environment for Castro's 26th of July Movement. Faced with a corrupt and ineffective military, itself dispirited by a U.S. Government embargo on weapons sales to Cuba, and public indignation and revulsion at his brutality toward opponents, Batista fled on January 1, 1959. Although Castro had promised a return to constitutional rule and democratic elections along with social reforms, Castro used his control of the military to consolidate power by repressing all dissent from his decisions, marginalizing other resistance figures, and imprisoning or executing thousands of opponents. An estimated 3,200 people were executed by the Castro regime between 1959-62 alone. As the revolution became more radical, hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled the island.
Castro declared Cuba a socialist state on April 16, 1961. For the next 30 years, Castro pursued close relations with the Soviet Union and worked in concert with the geopolitical goals of Soviet communism, funding and fomenting violent subversive and insurrectional activities, as well as military adventurism, until the demise of the U.S.S.R. in 1991.
Relations between the United States and Cuba deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban regime expropriated U.S. properties and moved toward adoption of a one-party communist system. In response, the United States imposed an embargo on Cuba in October 1960, and, in response to Castro's provocations, broke diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961. Tensions between the two governments peaked during the October 1962 missile crisis.
GOVERNMENT
Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.
According to the Soviet-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power—and its Council of State when the body is not in session—has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.
Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. Due process is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving political offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.
The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crack-downs on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 human rights activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to nationalday celebrations. See also the Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.
Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by State Security even after their release from prison. Moreover, at least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison during that period for opposing the Cuban Government.
Principal Government Officials
Last Updated: 12/14/04
President of the Council of State: Castro Ruz, Fidel
First Vice Pres. of the Council of State: Castro Ruz, Raul, Gen.
Vice Pres. of the Council of State: Almeida Bosque, Juan
Vice Pres. of the Council of State: Colome Ibarra, Abelardo, Corps Gen.
Vice Pres. of the Council of State: Lage Davila, Carlos
Vice Pres. of the Council of State: Lazo Hernandez, Esteban
Vice Pres. of the Council of State: Machado Ventura, Jose Ramon
Min. Sec. of the Council of State: Miyar Barruecos, Jose M.
Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Castro Ruz, Fidel
First Vice Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Castro Ruz, Raul, Gen.
Vice Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Cienfuegos Gorriaran, Osmani
Vice Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Fernandez Alvarez, Jose Ramon
Vice Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Miret Prieto, Pedro
Vice Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Rivero Torres, Otto
Vice Pres. of the Council of Ministers: Rodriguez Garcia, Jose Luis
Sec. of the Council of Ministers: Lage Davila, Carlos
Min. of Agriculture: Jordan Morales, Alfredo
Min. of Auditing & Control: Pedraza Rodriguez, Lina
Min. of Basic Industries: Garcia Vera, Yadira
Min. of Construction: Figueroade la Paz, Fidel
Min. of Culture: Prieto Jimenez, Abel
Min. of Domestic Trade: Castillo Cuesta, Barbara
Min. of Economy & Planning: Rodriguez Garcia, Jose Luis
Min. of Education: Gomez Gutierrez, Luis I.
Min. of Finance & Prices: Barreiro Fajardo, Georgina
Min. of the Fishing Industry: Lopez Valdes, Alfredo
Min. of the Food Industry: Roca Iglesias, Alejandro
Min. of Foreign Investment & Economic Cooperation: Lomas Morales, Marta
Min. of Foreign Relations: Perez Roque, Felipe
Min. of Foreign Trade: de la Nuez Ramirez, Raul
Min. of Higher Education: Vecino Alegret, Fernando
Min. of Information Science & Communication: Gonzalez Planas, Ignacio
Min. of Interior: Colome Ibarra, Abelardo, Corps Gen.
Min. of Justice: Diaz Sotolongo, Roberto
Min. of Labor & Social Security: Morales Cartaya, Alfredo
Min. of Light Industry: Perez Othon, Jesus
Min. of Public Health: Balaguer Cabrera, Jose Ramon
Min. of the Revolutionary Armed Forces: Castro Ruz, Raul, Gen.
Min. of Science, Technology, & Environment:
Min. of the Steelworking Industry: Acosta Santana, Fernando
Min. of the Sugar Industry: Rosales del Toro, Ulises, Div. Gen.
Min of Tourism: Marrero Cruz, Manuel
Min. of Transportation: Pazo Torrado, Carlos Manuel
Min. Without Portfolio: Cabrisas Ruiz, Ricardo
Min. Without Portfolio: Lopez Rodriguez, Wilfredo
Pres., Central Bank of Cuba: Soberon Valdes, Francisco
Attorney General: Escalona Reguera, Juan
Permanent Representative to the UN, New York: Requeijo Gual, Orlando
NATIONAL SECURITY
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.
Since the loss of Sovietera subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in number and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems. The navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it, too, is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.
The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus, under the Ministry of Interior, to repress dissent within Cuba, and, in the last decade, has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.
ECONOMY
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 108,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, out of a total workforce of about 4.7 million people.
The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003 while 2004 promises to be little better. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.
Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this.
Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector.
Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons.
In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about __BODY__.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion.
Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to __BODY__ billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging more than 240% of face value.
To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 342 at the close of 2003. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and over-priced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees—even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premia which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.
Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. As of August 2004, 18 executives of foreign companies remain excluded from entry into the United States under Title IV of the Act, while 28 other cases are under active review. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.
In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment to 100,000 from a peak of 209,000. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. As of October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government will no longer issue new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.
A 2004 report by the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003, the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company's "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.
Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions such as the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11-billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1—"speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with more than 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers—principally physicians and nurses—in more than 20 nations.
Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.
Cuba's bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. The rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.
U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced the Initiative for a New Cuba that called on the Cuban Government to undertake political and economic reforms and conduct free and fair elections for the National Assembly. The Initiative challenged the Cuban Government to open its economy, allow independent trade unions, and end discriminatory practices against Cuban workers. President Bush made clear that his response to such concrete reforms would be to work with the U.S. Congress to ease the restrictions on trade and travel between the United States and Cuba. The Cuban Government did not enact any such reforms. Instead, elections for the National Assembly were held in January 2003, with 609 government-approved candidates running for 609 seats. That was followed by the March crackdown on members of civil society.
Then, in October 2003, President Bush created the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to help the Cuban people achieve the goal of a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy that is strongly supportive of fundamental political and economic freedoms. The commission has the mandate to identify additional measures to help bring an end to the dictatorship and to lay out a plan for effective and decisive U.S. assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba, should such assistance be requested by a free Cuba. The commission report outlines how the United States would be prepared to help a free Cuba improve its infrastructure and the environment; consolidate the transition and help build democracy; meet the basic needs of the Cuban people in health, education, housing, and social services; and create the core institutions of a free economy. These recommendations are not a prescription for Cuba's future, but an indication of the kind of assistance the United States and the international community should be prepared to offer a free Cuba.
The Commission recommended a more proactive, integrated, and disciplined approach to undermine the survival strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the dictatorship's end. The recommendations focus on actions available to the United States Government, allowing it to establish a strong foundation on which to build supportive international efforts. This comprehensive framework is composed of six interrelated tasks considered central to hastening change: empowering Cuban civil society; breaking the Cuban Government's information blockade on the Cuban people; denying resources to the regime; illuminating the reality of Castro's Cuba to the rest of the world; encouraging international diplomatic efforts to support Cuban civil society and challenge the Castro regime; and finally, undermining the regime's "succession strategy."
To these ends, President Bush has directed that up to $59 million be committed over the next 2 years to carry out democracy-building activities in Cuba and to improve access to news and information through improved broadcasts of Radio and Television Martí into Cuba. Funding will support efforts by youth, women, and Afro-Cubans to take greater action in support of democracy and human rights in Cuba and efforts by NGOs in selected third countries to highlight human rights abuses in Cuba, as part of a broader effort to discourage tourist travel and reinforce international attention on the plight of the Cuban people, including political prisoners and civil society.
Over the past decade, the regime has built an apparatus designed to exploit humanitarian aspects of U.S. policy, specifically to siphon off hundreds of millions of dollars for itself. To deny resources to the regime, U.S. law enforcement authorities have been directed to conduct "sting" operations against "mule" networks and others who illegally carry money to Cuba and to offer rewards to those whose reports on illegal remittances lead to enforcement actions; family visits to Cuba have been limited to one trip every 3 years under a specific license (individuals are eligible to apply for a specific license 3 years after their last visit to Cuba); and the current authorized per diem amount (the authorized amount allowed for food and lodging expenses for travel in Cuba) has been reduced from $164 per day to $50 per day (i.e., approximately eight times what a Cuban national would expect to earn during a 14-day visit) for all family visits to Cuba, based on the presumption that travelers will stay with family in Cuba.
U.S. policy also pursues a multilateral effort to press for democratic change by urging its friends and allies to actively promote a democratic transition and respect for human rights. The United States opposes consideration of Cuba's return to the OAS or inclusion in the Summit of the Americas process until there is a democratic Cuban Government. The United States has repeat-edly made clear, however, that it is prepared to respond reciprocally if the Cuban Government initiates fundamental, systematic, democratic change and respect for human rights.
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
HAVANA (USINT) Address: Calzada between L & M Streets; Phone: 011-537-833-3551/9; Fax: 011-537-833-2095; Workweek: Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5:00 pm
| AMB: |
James C. Cason |
| DCM: |
Edward Alexander Lee |
| CG: |
Richard C. Beer |
| POL: |
Francisco D. Sainz |
| MGT: |
David S. Elmo |
| AFSA: |
Geoff Schradrack |
| CLO: |
Peggy Heffern |
| ECO: |
Francisco D. Sainz |
| FMO: |
Richard Heffern |
| GSO: |
Charles Sewall |
| ICASS Chair: |
Kelly Keiderling |
| IMO: |
Marc Beroud |
| INS: |
John Wallace Bird |
| IPO: |
Fred Reichard |
| PAO: |
Kelly Keiderling-Franz |
| RSO: |
Thomas Borisch |
| Last Updated: 10/5/2004 |
TRAVEL
Consular Information Sheet
December 6, 2004
Country Description: Cuba is a totalitarian police state, which relies on repressive methods to maintain control. These methods, including intense physical and electronic surveillance of Cubans, are also extended to foreign travelers. Americans visiting Cuba should be aware that any encounter with a Cuban could be subject to surreptitious scrutiny by the Castro regime's secret police, the General Directorate for State Security (DGSE). Also, any interactions with average Cubans, regardless how well intentioned the American is, can subject that Cuban to harassment and/or detention, amongst other forms of repressive actions, by state security elements. The regime is strongly anti-American yet desperate for U.S. dollars to prop itself up. The United States does not have full diplomatic relations with Cuba, but provides consular and other services through the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The U.S. Interests Section operates under the legal protection of the Swiss government but is not co-located with the Swiss Embassy.
Entry/Exit Requirements/Travel Transaction Limitations: The Cuban Assets Control Regulations of the U.S. Treasury Department require that persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction be licensed to engage in any transaction related to travel to, from, and within Cuba. Transactions related to tourist travel are not licensable. This restriction includes tourist travel to Cuba from or through a third country such as Mexico or Canada. U.S. law enforcement authorities have increased enforcement of these regulations at U.S. airports and pre-clearance facilities in third countries. Travelers who fail to comply with Department of Treasury regulations will face civil penalties and criminal prosecution upon return to the United States.
Licenses are granted to the following categories of travelers and they are permitted to spend money for Cuban travel and to engage in other transactions directly incident to the purpose of their travel under a general license, without the need to obtain special permission from the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
- Journalists and supporting broadcasting or technical personnel (regularly employed in that capacity by a news reporting organization and traveling for journalistic activities)
- Official government travelers on official business.
- Members of international organizations of which the United States is also a member (traveling on official business).
- Travelers who have received specific licenses from OFAC prior to going.
- Full-time professionals whose travel transactions are directly related to research in their professional areas, provided that their research: 1) is of a noncommercial, academic nature; 2) comprises a full work schedule in Cuba; and 3) has a substantial likelihood of public dissemination.
- Full-time professionals whose travel transactions are directly related to attendance at professional meetings or conferences in Cuba organized by an international professional organization, institution, or association that regularly sponsors such meetings or conferences in other countries. An organization, institution, or association headquartered in the United States may not sponsor such a meeting or conference unless it has been specifically licensed to sponsor it. The purpose of the meeting or conference cannot be the promotion of tourism in Cuba or other commercial activities involving Cuba, or to foster production of any bio-technological products.
Specific Licenses to Visit Immediate Family Members in Cuba: OFAC will issue specific licenses authorizing travel-related transactions incident to one visit lasting no more than 14 days to immediate family members who are nationals of Cuba per three-year period. For those who emigrated to the United States from Cuba, and have not since that time visited a family member in Cuba, the three-year period will be counted from the date they left Cuba. For all others, the three year period will be counted from the date they last left Cuba pursuant to the preexisting family visit general license, or from the date their family visit specific license was issued.
Travelers wishing to visit an immediate family member in Cuba who is authorized to be in Cuba, but is not a national of Cuba, may be granted a specific license in exigent circumstances provided that the U.S. Interests Section in Havana concurs in the issuance of such a license.
Specific Licenses for Educational Institutions: Specific licenses may be issued by OFAC to authorize travel transactions related to certain educational activities by students or employees at U.S. undergraduate or graduate institutions. Such licenses must be renewed after a period of one year. Once an academic institution has applied for and received such a specific license, the following categories of travelers affiliated with that academic institution are authorized to engage in travel-related transactions incident to the following activities without seeking further authorization from OFAC:
Undergraduate or graduate students participating in a structured educational program lasting at least 10 weeks as part of a course offered at a U.S. undergraduate or graduate institution. Students planning to engage in such transactions must carry a letter from the licensed institution stating: 1) the institution's license number; 2) that the student is enrolled in an undergraduate or graduate degree program at the institution; and 3) that the travel is part of an educational program of that institution.
Persons doing noncommercial Cuba-related academic research in Cuba for the purpose of qualifying academically as a professional (e.g., research toward a graduate degree). Students planning to engage in such transactions must carry a letter from the licensed institution stating: 1) the institution's license number; 2) that the student is enrolled in a graduate degree program at the institution; and 3) that the Cuba research will be accepted for credit toward that graduate degree.
Undergraduate or graduate students participating in a formal course of study lasting at least 10 weeks at a Cuban academic institution, provided that the Cuban study will be accepted for credit toward a degree at the licensed U.S. institution. A student planning to engage in such transactions must carry a letter from the licensed U.S. institution stating: 1) that the individual is a student currently enrolled in an undergraduate or graduate degree program, or a full-time permanent employee at the institution; 2) that the Cuba-related travel is part of a structured educational program of that institution that will last at least 10 weeks; and 3) citing the institution's license number.
Persons regularly employed in a teaching capacity at a licensed U.S. undergraduate or graduate institution who plan to teach part or all of an academic program at a Cuban academic institution for at least 10 weeks. An individual planning to engage in such transactions must carry a letter from the licensed institution stating: 1) the institution's license number; and 2) that the individual is regularly employed by the licensed institution in a teaching capacity.
Cuban scholars teaching or engaging in other scholarly activities at a licensed college or university in the United States. Licensed institutions may sponsor such Cuban scholars, including payment of a stipend or salary. The Cuban scholar may remit all such stipends or salary payments back to Cuba.
Full-time employees of a licensed institution organizing or preparing for the educational activities described above. An individual engaging in such transactions must carry a letter from the licensed institution stating: 1) the institution's license number; and 2) that the individual is regularly employed there.
Specific Licenses for Religious Organizations: Specific licenses may be issued by OFAC to religious organizations to authorize individuals affiliated with the organization to engage in travel transactions under the auspices of the religious organization. Applications by religious organizations for such licenses should include examples of the religious activities to be undertaken in Cuba. All individuals traveling pursuant to a religious organization's license must carry with them a letter from the licensed organization citing the number of the license and confirming that they are affiliated with the organization and that they are traveling to Cuba to engage in religious activities under the auspices of the organization.
Other Specific Licenses: Specific licenses may be issued by OFAC, on a case-by-case basis, authorizing travel transactions by the following categories of persons in connection with the following activities:
Humanitarian Projects and Support for the Cuban People – 1) Persons traveling in connection with activities that are intended to provide support for the Cuban people, such as activities of recognized human rights organizations. 2) Persons whose travel transactions are directly related to certain humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba that are designed to directly benefit the Cuban people. Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple trips over an extended period of time are available.
Free-Lance Journalism – Persons with a suitable record of publication who are traveling to Cuba to do research for a free-lance article. Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple trips over an extended period of time are available for applicants demonstrating a significant record of free-lance journalism.
Professional Research and Professional Meetings – Persons traveling to Cuba to do professional research or to attend a professional meeting that does not meet the requirements of the relevant general license (described above). Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple trips over an extended period of time are available.
Religious Activities – Persons traveling to Cuba to engage in religious activities that are not authorized pursuant to a religious organization's specific license. Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple trips over an extended period of time are available.
Public Performances, Athletic or Other Competitions, and Exhibitions – Persons traveling to participate in a public performance, athletic or other competition (that does not meet the requirements of the general license described above), or exhibition. The event must be open for attendance, and in relevant situations participation, by the Cuban public, and all profits from the event after costs must be donated to an independent nongovernmental organization in Cuba or a U.S.-based charity with the objective, to the extent possible, of promoting people-to-people contacts or otherwise benefiting the Cuban people.
Amateur or semi-professional athletes or teams traveling to participate in Cuba in an athletic competition held under the auspices of the relevant international sports federation. The athletes must have been selected for the competition by the relevant U.S. sports federation, and the competition must be one that is open for attendance, and in relevant situations participation, by the Cuban people.
Activities of Private Foundations or Research or Educational Institutions – Persons traveling to Cuba on behalf of private foundations or research or educational institutes that have an established interest in international relations to collect information related to Cuba for noncommercial purposes. Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple trips over an extended period of time are available.
Exportation, Importation, or Transmission of Information or Informational Materials – Persons traveling to engage in activities directly related to the exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational materials.
Licensed Exportation – Persons traveling to Cuba to engage in activities directly related to marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing of exports of health care products or other exports that may be considered for authorization under existing Department of Commerce regulations and guidelines with respect to Cuba or engaged in by U.S.owned or –controlled foreign firms.
Applying for a Specific License: Persons wishing to travel to Cuba under a specific license should send a letter specifying the details of the proposed travel, including any accompanying documentation, to David Mills, Chief of Licensing, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20220. Academic institutions wishing to obtain one of the two-year specific licenses described above should send a letter to the same address requesting such a license and establishing that the institution is accredited by an appropriate national or regional accrediting association. Religious organizations wishing to obtain one of the two-year specific licenses described above should send a letter to the same address requesting such a license and setting forth examples of religious activities to be undertaken in Cuba.
The United States maintains a broad embargo against trading with Cuba, and most commercial imports from Cuba are prohibited by law. The sale of certain items, including medicine and medical supplies, and agricultural commodities have been approved for export by specific legislation. The Department of the Treasury may issue licenses on a case-by-case basis authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions directly incident to marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, and servicing of exports and re-exports that appear consistent with the licensing policy of the Department of Commerce.
The sectors in which U.S. citizens may sell and service products to Cuba include agricultural commodities, telecommunications activities, medicine, and medical devices. The Treasury Department will also consider requests for specific licenses for humanitarian travel not covered by the general license, educational exchanges (of at least 10 weeks in duration), and religious activities by individuals or groups affiliated with a religious organization.
Unless otherwise exempted or authorized, any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who engages in any travel-related transaction in Cuba violates the regulations. Failure to comply with Department of Treasury regulations may result in civil penalties and criminal prosecution upon return to the United States.
Additional information may be obtained by contacting: Licensing Division; Office of Foreign Assets Control; U.S. Department of the Treasury; 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW; Treasury Annex; Washington, DC 20220; Telephone (202) 622-2480; Fax (202) 622-1657. Internet users can log on to the web site through http://www.treas.gov/ofac/.
Should a traveler receive a license, a valid passport is required for entry into Cuba. The Cuban government requires that the traveler obtain a visa prior to arrival. Attempts to enter or exit Cuba illegally, or to aid the irregular exit of Cuban nationals or other persons, are contrary to Cuban law and are punishable by jail terms. Entering Cuban territory, territorial waters or airspace (within 12 miles of the Cuban coast) without prior authorization from the Cuban government may result in arrest or other enforcement action by Cuban authorities. Immigration violators are subject to prison terms ranging from four years for illegal entry or exit to as many as 30 years for aggravated cases of alien smuggling. For current information on Cuban entry and customs requirements, travelers should contact:
Cuban Interests Section (an office of the Cuban government)
2630 16th Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
Telephone (202) 797-8518;
Fax (202) 797-8521
Consular Section
2639 16 th Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
Telephone (202) 797-8609/8610/8615;
Fax (202) 986-7283
In an effort to prevent international child abduction, many governments have initiated procedures at entry/exit points. These often include requiring documentary evidence of relationship and permission for the child's travel from the parent(s) or legal guardian not present. Having such documentation on hand, even if not required, may facilitate entry/departure.
The Cuban Air Force shot down two U.S. registered civilian aircraft in international airspace in 1996. As a result of this action, the President of the United States and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an "Emergency Cease and Desist Order and Statement of Policy," which allows for vigorous enforcement action against U.S. registered aircraft that violate Cuban airspace. Additional information is available through the FAA's Internet web site at http://www.intl.faa.gov, (click on 'Americas/Spain and then 'Cuba) or by telephone at 202-267-3210.
In addition to the appropriate general or specific license, aircraft and vessels seeking to travel to Cuba must obtain a temporary sojourn license from the Department of Commerce. Temporary sojourn licenses are not available for pleasure boaters. Additional information is available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/. Pursuant to an Executive Order issued after the 1996 shootdown incident, boaters departing south Florida ports with the intention of entering Cuban territorial waters also must obtain permission in advance from the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard provides automated information at 1-800-582-5943. See our Foreign Entry Requirements brochure for more information on Cuba and other countries.
Safety and Security: In the opening months of 2003, there were numerous attempts to hijack aircraft and ocean-going vessels by Cubans seeking to depart from Cuba. In several cases, these attempts involved the use of weapons by the hijackers. Cuban authorities failed in their efforts to prevent two air hijackings, largely because of weak security procedures at satellite airports. U.S. citizens, although not necessarily targets, may be caught up in any violence during an attempted hijacking. Accordingly, U.S. citizens should exercise caution when traveling by public transportation within Cuba.
The United States Government has publicly and repeatedly announced that any person who hijacks (or attempts to hijack) an aircraft or vessel (common carrier or other) will face the maximum penalties pursuant to U.S. law, regardless of that person's nationality. In Cuba, hijackers will be sentenced to lengthy prison terms at a minimum, and may be subject to the death penalty; on April 11, 2003, the Government of Cuba executed three suspected hijackers, nine days after taking them into custody.
The waters around Cuba can be dangerous to navigation. Since 1993 there have been at least ten shipwrecks involving U.S. citizens. U.S. boaters who have encountered problems requiring repairs in Cuba have found repair services to be expensive and frequently not up to U.S. standards. Note that it is not permitted by law for U.S. persons to use such repair services in non-emergency situations. Any U.S. person who makes use of Cuban repair facilities should be prepared to provide documentary evidence demonstrating the emergency nature of that activity. The government of Cuba often holds boats as collateral to assure payment for salvage and repair services. Transferring funds from the U.S. to pay for boat repairs in Cuba is complicated by restrictions codified in U.S. law relating to commercial transactions with the Government of Cuba. A Treasury license is required for such payments.
For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet web site at http://travel.state.gov where the current Worldwide Caution Public Announcement, Travel Warnings and Public Announcements can be found. Up-to-date information on safety and security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S., or for callers outside the U.S. and Canada, a regular toll-line at 1-317-472-2328. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).
The Department of State urges American citizens to take responsibility for their own personal security while traveling overseas. For general information about appropriate measures travelers can take to protect themselves in an overseas environment, see the Department of State's pamphlet A Safe Trip Abroad.
Crime: Although crime against U.S. and other foreign travelers in Cuba has generally been limited to pick-pocketing, purse snatching, or the taking of unattended items, the U.S. Interests Section has received increased reports of violent assaults against individuals in connection with robberies. In cases of violent crime, Americans should not resist if confronted, as perpetrators are usually armed with a knife or machete and often work with partners.
Pickpocketings and purse snatchings usually occur in crowded areas such as markets, beaches, and other gathering points, including Old Town Havana. Travelers should use caution in all such areas and are advised not to leave belongings unattended, nor to carry purses and bags loosely over one's shoulder. Visitors should avoid wearing flashy jewelry or displaying large amounts of cash. When possible, visitors should carry a copy of their passport with them and leave the original at a secure location.
Thefts of property from air travelers' baggage have become increasingly common. All travelers should ensure that valuables remain under their personal control at all times, and are never put into checked baggage.
Information for Victims of Crime: The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If you are the victim of a crime while over-seas, in addition to reporting to local police, please contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate for assistance. The Embassy/Consulate staff can, for example, assist you to find appropriate medical care, to contact family members or friends and explain how funds could be transferred. Although the investigation and prosecution of the crime is solely the responsibility of local authorities, consular officers can help you to understand the local criminal justice process and to find an attorney if needed. Posts in countries that have victims of crime assistance programs should include that information. See our information on Victims of Crime at http://travel.state.gov/travel/brochure_victim_assistance.html.
Medical Facilities and Health Information: Medical care does not meet U.S. standards. While medical professionals are generally competent, many health facilities face shortages of medical supplies and bed space. Many medications are unavailable so travelers to Cuba should bring with them any prescribed medicine in its original container and in amounts commensurate with personal use. A copy of the prescription and a letter from the prescribing physician explaining the need for prescription drugs facilitates their entry into the country.
Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747); fax 1-888-CDC-FAXX (1-888-232-3299), or via the CDC's Internet site at http://www.cdc.gov/travel.
For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad consult the World Health Organization's (WHO) website at http://www.who.int/en. Further health information for travelers is available at http://www.who.int/ith.
Medical Insurance: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and whether it will cover emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation.
Traffic Safety and Road Conditions: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below Cuba is provided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or circumstance.
Driving is on the right-hand side of the road; speed limits are sometimes posted and generally respected. Reports suggest that accidents involving motor vehicles are now the leading cause of accidental death in Cuba.
Passengers in automobiles are not required to wear seatbelts and motor-cyclists are not required to wear helmets, as these are not generally available on the local market. Many accidents involve motorists striking pedestrians or bicyclists. Drivers found responsible for accidents resulting in serious injury or death are subject to prison terms of up to 10 years, and Cuban authorities may prohibit drivers of rental cars who are involved in accidents from leaving the country until all claims associated with an accident are settled. Additionally, the Interests Section notes that mere witnesses to vehicular accidents may not be permitted to leave Cuba until an investigation into the accident has been completed.
Taxis are available in busy commercial and tourist areas; radio-dispatched taxis are generally clean and reliable. Travelers should be aware that licensed taxis available near hotel areas are often driven by DGSE agents, or the drivers report to the DGSE, as a part of the regime's efforts to follow the activities of foreign visitors. However, travelers should not accept rides in unlicensed taxis as they may be used by thieves to rob passengers. Buses designated for tourist travel, both between and within cities, generally meet international standards for both cleanliness and safety. Public buses used by Cubans, known as "guaguas" or "camellos," are crowded, unreliable and havens for pickpockets. These public buses will usually not offer rides to foreign visitors.
Although popular with tourists, the three-wheeled, yellow-hooded "Co-Co" taxis are highly unsafe and should be avoided. "Co-Co" taxis are modified motorcycles that reach speeds of up to 40 mph, but have no seat belts or other safety features.
Although the main arteries of Havana are generally well-maintained, secondary streets often are not. Many roads and city streets are unlit, making night driving dangerous, especially as some cars and most bicycles lack running lights or reflectors. Street signage tends to be insufficient and confusing. Most Cuban cars are old, in poor condition and lack turn signals and other standard safety equipment. Drivers should exercise extreme care.
The principal Cuban east-west highway is in good condition but lacks lights and extends only two-thirds of the way from Havana to the eastern tip of the island. The extension of that highway on to the east is in poor condition in many areas, with washed out sections and deep potholes. Night driving should be strictly avoided outside urban areas. Secondary rural roads are narrow, and some are in such bad condition as to be impassable by cars. Due to the rarity of cars on rural roads, pedestrians, bicycles, and farm equipment operators wander onto the roads without any regard to possible automobile traffic. Unfenced livestock constitute another serious road hazard.
Rental car agencies provide roadside assistance to their clients as a condition of the rental contract. Cuban authorities may prohibit drivers of rental cars who are involved in accident from leaving the country, even if they are injured and require medical evacuation, until all claims associated with an accident are settled. Travelers should not permit unauthorized persons to drive the rental vehicle. Automobile renters are provided telephone numbers to call in Havana or in other places where they might be motoring; agencies respond as needed with tow trucks and/or mechanics. A similar service is available to foreigners resident in Cuba who insure cars with the National Insurance Company.
Aviation Safety Oversight: As there is no direct scheduled commercial air service between the United States and Cuba, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not assessed Cuba's Civil Aviation Authority for compliance with ICAO international aviation safety standards. For more information, travelers may visit the FAA's internet web site at www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/index.cfm.
Because of serious concerns about the safety and security standards, maintenance regime and history of fatal accidents, including the hijacking concerns noted above of the Cuban flag carrier, Cubana de Aviacion, as well as other Cuban carriers on-island, U.S. Interests Section staff and official visitors to Cuba are instructed to avoid flying aboard either the domestic or the international flights of any Cuban airline, including Cubana de Aviacion.
Americans considering travel on any Cuban airline may wish to defer their travel or pursue an alternative means of transportation. The Department of Defense (DOD) separately assesses some foreign air carriers for suitability for information regarding the DOD policy on specific carriers, travelers may contact DOD at (618) 256-4801.
Special Circumstances: Photographing military or police installations or personnel, or harbor, rail, and airport facilities is forbidden.
Dual Nationality: The Government of Cuba does not recognize the U.S. nationality of U.S. citizens who are Cuban-born or are the children of Cuban parents. These individuals will be treated solely as Cuban citizens and may be subject to a range of restrictions and obligations, including military service. The Cuban government may require U.S. citizens, whom Cuba considers to be Cuban, to enter and depart Cuba using a Cuban passport. Using a Cuban passport for this purpose does not jeopardize one's U.S. citizenship; however, such persons must use their U.S. passports to enter and depart the United States. There have been cases of Cuban-American dual nationals being forced by the Cuban government to surrender their U.S. passports. Despite these restrictions, Cuban-American dual nationals who fall ill may only be treated at hospitals for foreigners (except in emergencies). See the paragraph below on Consular Access for information on Cuba's denial of consular services to dual American-Cuban nationals who have been arrested, as well as the paragraph below on Children's Issues for information on how dual-nationality may affect welfare inquiries and custody disputes.
Consular Access: U.S. citizens are encouraged to carry a copy of their U.S. passport with them at all times, so that, if questioned by local officials, proof of identity and U.S. citizenship are readily available. The original should be kept in a safe location.
Cuba does not recognize the right or obligation of the U.S. Government to protect Cuban-born American citizens, whom the Cuban government views as Cuban citizens only. Cuban authorities consistently refuse to notify the U.S. Interests Section of the arrest of Cuban-American dual nationals and deny U.S. consular officers access to them. They also withhold information concerning their welfare and proper treatment under Cuban law.
Currency Regulations: Beginning in November 2004, the U.S. dollar is no longer accepted for commercial transactions. The Cuban government now requires the use of convertible Cuban pesos ("chavitos") for all transactions.
Cuba-Related Travel Transactions: Only persons whose travel falls into the categories mentioned above (under "Entry Requirements/Travel Transaction Limitations") may be authorized to spend money related to travel to, from, or within Cuba. Persons traveling to Cuba to visit immediate family members (a "member of the immediate family" is defined as a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling of the remitter or that remitter's spouse, as well as any spouse, widow or widower of any of the foregoing) pursuant to a specific-license may spend no more than $50 per day on non-transportation-related expenses in Cuba, and up to an additional $50 per trip to pay for transportation-related expenses in Cuba.
Persons licensed to engage in other travel-related transactions in Cuba may spend up to the State Department Travel Per Diem Allowance for Havana, Cuba, for purchases directly related to travel in Cuba, such as hotel accommodations, meals, local transportation, and goods personally used by the traveler in Cuba (travelers can check the current per diem rate on the Internet at http://www.state.gov/www/perdiems/index.html).
Most licensed travelers may also spend additional money for transactions directly related to the activities for which they received their license. For example, journalists traveling in Cuba under the journalism general license (described above) may spend money over and above the current per diem for extensive local transportation, the hiring of cable layers, and other costs that are directly related to covering a story in Cuba. Purchases of services unrelated to travel or a licensed activity, such as non-emergency medical services, are prohibited. The purchase of publications and other information materials is not restricted.
Sending or Carrying Money to Cuba: U.S. persons aged 18 or older may send to members of the remitter's immediate family in Cuba or to a Cuban national in a third country "family" cash remittances of up to $300 per household in any consecutive three-month period, provided that no member of the household is a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party (The term "prohibited official of the Government of Cuba" means: Ministers and Vice-Ministers, members of the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers; members and employees of the National Assembly of People's Power; members of any provincial assembly; local sector chiefs of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; Director Generals and sub-Director Generals and higher of all Cuban ministries and state agencies; employees of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT); employees of the Ministry of Defense (MINFAR); secretaries and first secretaries of the Confederation of Labor of Cuba (CTC) and its component unions; chief editors, editors, and deputy editors of Cuban state-run media organizations and programs, including newspapers, television, and radio; and members and employees of the Supreme Court (Tribuno Supremo Nacional). The term "prohibited members of the Cuban Communist Party" means: members of the Politburo, the Central Committee, Department Heads of the Central Committee; employees of the Central Committee; and secretary and first secretary of the provincial Party central committee) No more than a combined total of $300 of family remittances may be sent by a remitter to any one household in any consecutive three-month period, regardless of the number of members of the remitter's immediate family residing in that household. A licensed traveler may carry up to $300 of his own family remittances to Cuba.
U.S. persons also may send up to __BODY__,000 per payee on a one-time basis as an "emigration-related" remittance to a Cuban national to enable the payee to emigrate from Cuba to the United States. Specifically, up to $500 may be remitted to a Cuban national prior to the payee's receipt of a valid U.S. visa or other U.S. immigration document, and up to $500 may be remitted to the Cuban national after the payee receives a valid U.S. visa or other U.S. immigration document. A licensed traveler may only carry immigration remittances to Cuba if the visa has already been issued.
Remittances must be transferred through an OFAC-licensed depository institution or remittance forwarder. These OFAC-licensed entities originating transfers on behalf of non-aggregating customers must obtain an affidavit from the remitter certifying that each family remittance does not exceed $300 in any consecutive three-month period and that each emigration-related remittance meets the requirement of the Regulations. Remitters can expect to have their identity, date of birth, address, and telephone number verified.
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens are prohibited from using credit cards in Cuba. U.S. credit card companies do not accept vouchers from Cuba, and Cuban shops, hotels and other places of business do not accept U.S. credit cards. Neither personal checks nor travelers' checks drawn on U.S. banks are accepted in Cuba.
Exportation of Accompanied Baggage: Authorized travelers to Cuba are limited to 44 pounds of accompanied baggage per traveler unless a specific license from OFAC or the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security authorizes a higher amount.
What Can Be Brought Back: If U.S. travelers return from Cuba with Cuban origin goods, such goods, with the exception of informational materials, may be seized at Customs' discretion. [Section 515.204 of the Regulations.] Cuban cigars and rum are routinely confiscated at U.S. ports of entry. The fact that Cuban cigars and rum are purchased in a "duty free" shop at the Havana Airport does not exempt them from seizure by US customs. There are no limits on the import or export of informational materials [Section 515.206 of the Regulations]. Such materials, for example books, films, tapes and CDs, are statutorily exempt from regulation under the embargo and may be transported freely. However, blank tapes and CDs are not considered informational materials and may be seized.
Fair Business Practices: Anyone authorized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide Cuban travel services or services in connection with sending money to Cuba is prohibited from participating in the discriminatory practices of the Cuban government against individuals or particular classes of travelers. The assessment of consular fees by the Cuban government, which are applicable worldwide, is not considered to be a discriminatory practice. However, requiring the purchase of services not desired by the traveler is not permitted. Persons wishing to provide information regarding arbitrary fees, payments for unauthorized purposes, or other possible violations furnished to the U.S. Treasury Department will be handled confidentially.
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens are prohibited from using credit cards in Cuba. U.S. credit card companies do not accept vouchers from Cuba, and Cuban shops, hotels and other places of business do not accept U.S. credit cards. Neither personal checks nor travelers' checks drawn on U.S. banks are accepted in Cuba.
Criminal Penalties: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations, which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States and may not afford the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offences. Persons violating Cuba's laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Cuba are severe, and convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences and heavy fines. Those accused of drug-related and other crimes face long legal proceedings and delayed due process. In one recent drug arrest, two American citizens were sentenced to terms of 25 and 30 years. In another recent criminal case, the accused was detained for more than 18 months without a trial.
Cuba's Law of Protection of National Independence and the Cuban Economy contains a series of measures aimed at discouraging contact between foreign nationals and Cuban citizens. These measures are aimed particularly at the press and media representatives, but may be used against any foreign national coming into contact with a Cuban. The law provides for jail terms of up to 30 years in aggravated cases. U.S. citizens traveling in Cuba are subject to this law, and they may unwittingly cause the arrest and imprisonment of any Cuban with whom they come into contact.
For more information, please contact the U.S. Interests Section's American Citizens Services Unit at:
U.S. Interests Section
American Citizen Services Unit
Calzada, entre L y M
Vedado, Havana, Cuba
Phone: 53-7-833-3551
(through 3559);
Fax: 53-7-833-1084
Engaging in sexual conduct with children (persons under the age of 18) or using or disseminating child pornography in a foreign country is a crime, prosecutable in both the United States and Cuba.
Children's Issues: Cuba does not allow adoption of children by U.S. citizens. Additionally, children who maintain both Cuban and U.S. citizenship are considered to be Cuban citizens by the Government of Cuba because dual nationality is not recognized. Consequently, requests to verify the welfare and inquiries regarding the whereabouts of children living with their Cuban parents and/or relatives may be more difficult to answer. In the event of a custody dispute, the American parent will need to pursue a legal hearing in Cuba with the assistance of a Cuban attorney. The Interests Section can provide a list of attorneys practicing in the Havana area to interested parties.
For information on international adoption of children and international parental child abduction, see the Office of Children's Issues web-site at http://travel.state.gov/family/index.html.
U.S. Representation/Registration: The U.S. Interests Section (USINT) represents American citizens and the U.S. Government in Cuba, and operates under the legal protection of the Swiss government. The Interests Section staff provides the full range of American citizen and other consular services. U.S. citizens who travel to Cuba are encouraged to contact and register with USINT's American Citizen Services section.
U.S. citizens who register at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana may obtain updated information on travel and security within the country. There is no access to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay from within Cuba. Consular issues for Guantanamo Bay are handled by the U.S. Embassy in Kingston, Jamaica. For further information on Guantanamo Bay, please contact the U.S. Embassy in Kingston at telephone (876) 929-5374.
International Parental Child Abduction
January 2005
The information below has been edited from the report of the State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Overseas Citizens Services. For more information, please read the International Parental Child Abduction section of this book and review current reports online at travel.state.gov
Disclaimer: The information in this circular relating to the legal requirements of a specific foreign country is provided for general information only. Questions involving interpretation of specific foreign laws should be addressed to foreign legal counsel.
General Information: Cuba is not a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, nor are there any international or bilateral treaties in force between Cuba and the United States dealing with international parental child abduction. American citizens who travel to Cuba place themselves under the jurisdiction of local courts. American citizens planning a trip to Cuba with dual national children should bear this in mind.
Custody Disputes: In Cuba, if parents are legally married they share the custody of their children. If they are not married and the parents cannot reach an agreement, custody is granted by the courts in the best interests of the child. Foreign court orders are not automatically recognized.
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Custody orders and judgments of foreign courts are not enforceable in Cuba.
Visitation Rights: In cases where one parent has been granted custody of a child, the other parent is usually granted visitation rights. If a custodial parent fails to allow visitation, the non-custodial parent may appeal to the court.
Dual Nationality: Dual nationality is not recognized under Cuban law.
Travel Restrictions: Cuban citizen children (including dual nationals) are required to have exit visas to depart Cuba.
Criminal Remedies: For information on possible criminal remedies, please contact your local law enforcement authorities or the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Information is also available on the Internet at the web site of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org.
Persons who wish to pursue a child custody claim in a Cuban court should retain an attorney in Cuba. The U.S. Interests Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Cuba maintains a list of attorneys willing to represent American clients.
Embassy of Switzerland
U.S. Interests Section
Calzada between L & M Streets
Vedado, Havana, Cuba
Telephone: 011-53-7-33-3551/59;
Fax: 011-53-7-33-3700
Web site: http://www.usembassy.state.gov
*The workweek for the Embassy is Monday through Friday from 8:30am to 5:00pm.
Questions involving Cuban law should be addressed to a Cuban attorney or to the Cuban Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in the United States at:
Embassy of Switzerland
Cuban Interests Section
2630 16th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
Telephone: (202) 797-8518
