HATE CRIME
A crime motivated by racial, religious, gender, sexual orientation, or other prejudice.
Ward v. Utah
The U.S. SUPREME COURT has upheld the constitutionality of some state hate crime statutes, including laws that enhance criminal penalties for defendants whose crimes were motivated by racism and other forms of bigotry. Hate crime statutes have been directed at defendants who have burned crosses in the yards of African-American families or those who have assaulted someone because of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. In Ward v. Utah, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 419760 (2005), however, the state of Utah charged an animal rights protester with violating a hate crime statute (one that did not mention any particular class of victims) that made it a crime to act "with the intent to intimidate or terrorize another person." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.3. Though the prosecution ultimately dropped all charges, the protester challenged the constitutionality of the statute, contending that it violated his FIRST AMENDMENT rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments, concluding that the law was not overbroad, vague, or an improper time, place, or manner restriction.
Eric Ward, an ardent advocate for the ethical treatment of animals, regularly participated in demonstrations in support of his views. In November 1999, Ward was one of a number of people who attended a candlelight vigil in Magna, Utah, in support of animal rights. At that gathering, a mink stole was set on fire. Thirteen months later, in December 2000, the state charged Ward with misdemeanor disorderly conduct and with an enhancement provision that raised the charge to a felony. The provision authorized enhancing the severity of the criminal charge for certain offenses, including disorderly conduct, where the defendant intended to "intimidate or terrorize" under §76-3-203.3. It was unclear from the factual record whether the state believed that Ward had burned the mink stole. It was also unclear why the state waited so long to charge him with a crime. Finally, the state did not present any evidence to show why it believed that the enhancement provision was justified. Two weeks after charging Ward, the state dropped the enhancement charge and ultimately dismissed all charges. However, the felony arrest became part of Ward's record.
Ward, who planned to participate in more animal rights demonstrations, feared that the state could invoke the felony-enhancement provision in the future. Therefore, he filed a federal civil rights suit against state officials in federal district court, alleging that §76-3-203.3 was unconstitutional. He asked the court to declare the provision unconstitutional and to issue an injunction prohibiting the state from applying it to him. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that Ward lacked legal standing to bring the case. The enhancement provision could only be applied if Ward had committed a misdemeanor, yet he had declared that he would participate in lawful protests. Therefore, Ward would never be a defendant under the enhancement provision and had no stake in pursuing a constitutional challenge of the law. It is a fundamental principle of U.S. constitutional law and the adversarial system that a party must have a stake in the out-come. Ward then filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that he did have standing. The court agreed and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the substantive issues.
Ward argued that the enhancement provision was, on its face, unconstitutionally broad, vague, and an improper time, place, or manner restriction. The district court rejected his claims, ruling that the provision was not overbroad because it required the commission of a misdemeanor. It was not vague because the law had a scienter requirement; scienter requires a defendant to have the specific intent to commit the prohibited act. Crimes that require specific intent are tougher to enforce because the state has to prove the defendant's state of mind. Finally, the district court found that the law was content-neutral (i.e., the law did not seek to prosecute persons who held specific viewpoints), and thus the provision was a lawful means of restricting speech.
Ward again appealed the dismissal of his case to the Tenth Circuit. A three-judge panel unanimously held that the district court had interpreted the law correctly. Chief Circuit Judge Deanell Reece Tacha, writing for the court, noted that Ward had incorrectly labeled his First Amendment claims as both as-applied and facial challenges. Because the charges had been dismissed, the law had not been applied to him. Instead, Ward had raised a facial challenge, an argument that the law on its face, and in its own language, was unconstitutional. Judge Tacha stated that facial challenges are "strong medicine" and should be avoided if possible, for the common law method usually looks to specific facts and legal arguments rather than to generalized abstractions. Therefore, Ward had a more difficult task in convincing the court that §76-3-203.3 was unconstitutional.
Judge Tacha essentially agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of the district court. The state needed to prove that a defendant had committed a specifically listed misdemeanor, that he had sought, with specific intent, to cause another person to fear for his physical safety, and that he had done so "with the specific intent to cause another person to fear to exercise freely or enjoy any right secured by state or federal law." The First Amendment does not protect "true threats" or speech that raises the specter of violence. As long as Ward lawfully protested, the enhancement provision would not apply to his conduct.
